Analysis: Pezeshkian blames US for snapback mechanism deadlock
In an account published by the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has identified the United States as the primary obstacle to reaching an understanding between Tehran and European nations regarding the UN snapback mechanism. According to Pezeshkian, Iran and European parties reached understandings on several occasions, only for European consultations with Washington to prevent these from becoming final agreements. This claim, as reported by Maariv, lacks independent verification and should be viewed as the Iranian president's political position rather than a confirmed fact regarding closed-door negotiations. The significance of these remarks lies in Tehran's attempt to balance two seemingly conflicting messages: a willingness to continue dialogue with Europe and a rejection of any demands it deems irrational or tantamount to surrender. This stance suggests the Iranian government intends to keep diplomatic channels open while managing the domestic political costs of retreating from its stated red lines. The report does not indicate that a specific agreement is imminent or that Europe and the US have reached a unified position. Pezeshkian also dismissed reports of friction between his government and the armed forces, criticising efforts to drive a wedge between the political structure and the military. These comments appear aimed at projecting an image of internal cohesion amid military tensions and external pressure, though the Maariv report provides no independent evidence regarding the existence or absence of such internal divisions. The president's remarks concerning the Strait of Hormuz heighten the security sensitivity of the situation. He stated that Iranian forces engaged with vessels that had allegedly violated regulations, though the report provides no details regarding the identity of the ships, the nature of the violations, or the specifics of the incidents. Consequently, it is not possible to make a legal or military judgment based solely on this account. However, linking nuclear negotiations, maritime security, and the threat of continued conflict suggests that any new crisis in the Persian Gulf could directly impact diplomacy. Pezeshkian stated that Iran seeks peace and a focus on domestic affairs, yet emphasised that if forced to surrender, Tehran would fight. This can be interpreted as a message of deterrence combined with a potential political exit ramp, though this remains an analytical assessment rather than a confirmed operational decision. While he conditioned future progress on the guarantee of Iran's rights, the report does not define what those rights entail or what mechanism would secure them. His emphasis on Islamic unity and regional de-escalation aligns with Tehran's efforts to portray itself as a force for stability. Simultaneously, his assertion that Israel desires the continuation of the war frames the conflict within the context of regional rivalry and pressure on Tehran. This is a political assessment, and the report offers no independent evidence to verify it. In summary, according to the Maariv report, Pezeshkian's core message is not the announcement of a new deal, but the outlining of a conditional position: negotiations with Europe continue but are contingent on Tehran's terms; de-escalation is possible only if Iran's rights are guaranteed; and pressure to surrender will be met with resistance. The practical outcome of this stance depends on European behaviour, Washington's decisions regarding pressure versus diplomacy, and the management of tensions in the Strait of Hormuz—factors for which the report offers no definitive conclusion.